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1EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS UNDER
RETAILERS' STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
Rafael Moner, Jos¶ eJ .S e m p e r ea n dA m p a r oU r b a n o
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates what are the equilibrium distribution systems in
a successive duopoly when retailers hold the power to choose the number of
products they wish to market. Since they both can be multi-product sell-
ers, the number of possible channel structures considered is larger than in
previous work. Then, we study whether the resulting distribution systems
obtained in earlier papers still remain. In particular, whether there are in-
centives to adopt exclusive distribution agreements, whether a manufacturer
is foreclosed from the market and, essentially, whether there exists, at equi-
librium, enough inter and intra-brand competition.
The analysis shows that provided low brand asymmetry, it is su±cient that
retailers hold the power to choose the number of products they wish to
distribute to obtain endogenously both inter and intra-brand competition;
both retailers become multi-product sellers. However, as the pro¯tability of
brands diverges su±ciently, only the most pro¯table brand will be distributed
by both retailers thus only arising intra-brand competition at equilibrium.
Neither the exclusive distribution system nor a common distribution system
analized in the previous literature appears at equilibrium.
Keywords: Distribution systems, retailer power.
J.E.L. Classi¯cation: L19, L42.
21 Introduction
Large chains such as Carrefour, Wal-Mart, M¶ etro AG, Kroger and Inter-
march¶ e, have considerably increased their market shares. On the one hand,
concentration in the retail distribution industry seems unstoppable. On the
other, private label sales are growing impressively at the expense of compet-
ing national manufacturer brands in large stores. This clearly confers retailers
a stronger position vis µ a vis manufacturers in their e®ort to capture strategic
rents. Provided that shelf space is limited, retailers may set manufacturers
against each other by threatening not to carry their products. However, there
remains the question whether such behaviour, which will probably translate
into better terms of payment, leads to su±cient market competition.1
This paper investigates what are the equilibrium distribution systems in
a successive duopoly when retailers hold the power to choose the number of
products they wish to market. It is retailers that ¯x their product line and
since they both can be multi-product sellers, and intra-brand competition is
allowed, the number of possible channel structures considered is larger than
in previous work on this area. In this framework we wish to study whether
the resulting distribution systems obtained in earlier papers still remain. In
particular, whether there are incentives to adopt exclusive distribution agree-
ments, whether a manufacturer is foreclosed from the market and, essentially,
whether there exists, at equilibrium, enough inter and intra-brand competi-
tion.
Typically, retailers are assumed to set ¯nal prices - depending on the
contractual clauses - and are bound to accept the contracts designed by the
manufacturers.2 Some recent contributions do consider more decision power
1See e.g. Mills (1995) and Raju et al. (1995). Carrefour is the result of a recent
merger between Carrefour and Promod¶ es, and there are ongoing mergers of smaller size
both within and across countries in the European Union. A recent headline appeared in
El Pa¶ is (26th September '99) read: "Large distribution chains impose their conditions on
suppliers", which translates into a delay in payments from retailers to manufacturers.
2Representative papers in the literature on distribution systems include Bernheim and
Whinston (1985, 1998), Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Lin (1990), O'Brien and Sha®er
(1993), Besanko and Perry (1994), and Rey and Stiglitz (1995), only to mention a few.
Two distribution structures are studied: an exclusive distribution system and a common
distribution system.
3on the retailer's side. The retailer in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and in
the common subgame in O'Brien and Sha®er (1993) chooses to represent one
of the manufacturers, both of them or neither of them. The implications of
more retailer power are more speci¯cally studied by Gabrielsen and S¿rgard
(1999a) and by Sha®er (1991). In both these papers there is a stage at which
the retailer decides how many products to carry. The former authors con-
sider a three-stage game played by two independent manufacturers and a
retailer who, in the ¯rst stage, decides whether manufacturers' o®ers should
be exclusive dealing o®ers. This decision has a commitment value in that,
without commitment, the retailer would always carry both products. Sha®er
(1991) analyzes a two-product monopolist who sells to one retailer. Retailer
power stems from two facts: shelf space is scarce and the retailer's decision
on how many products to stock. This allows him to gain some strategic rent
which is dissipated when the manufacturer imposes contractual (vertical) re-
straints such as maximum resale price maintenance, full-line forcing or brand
discounts.
In contrast, we assume a duopolistic retailer structure which brings into
the model a further element of competition, that is, intra-brand rivalry. The
retailers can be multi-product sellers and this enlarges the set of possible
equilibrium distribution systems. Besides, and to concentrate on the strategic
motives behind retailers' decisions on product line we do not allow manufac-
turers to impose any type of vertical restraints. These assumptions precisely
aim at emphasizing retailer power rather than manufacturer power.3
More speci¯cally, the model we propose assumes two di®erentiated man-
ufacturers which are asymmetric because they are di®erently valued by con-
sumers, and two potential retailers who play a non-cooperative multi-stage
game. In the ¯rst stage, manufacturers simultaneously and independently
propose a contract to the retailers. The contract only speci¯es the terms of
payment, a linear transfer price. In the second stage, retailers are given the
3Another way of looking into the incentives for ¯rms to enter into exclusive trading
relations is to consider mutual vertical agreements by each manufacturer-retailer pairing.
This is studied by Chang (1992) and by Dobson and Waterson (1997). In equilibrium,
each manufacturer only supplies one retailer for the homogeneous good case, as in Chang
(1992), or does it for low levels of product and retailer di®erentiation, as in Dobson and
Waterson (1997).
4power to decide whether they wish to be supplied by one manufacturer, by
both or by none of them. Finally, and given the inherited outcome of the ¯rst
two stages, retailers compete µ al aC o u r n o t .T h u s ,w eb u i l dam o d e lw h e r et h e
existence of both inter and intra-brand competition is endogenously derived
when retailer power is important.4
The analysis shows that, despite the fact that competition between re-
tailers is intense (since they are not di®erentiated), and provided low brand
asymmetry, it is su±cient that retailers hold the power to choose the number
of products they wish to distribute to obtain endogenously both inter and
intra-brand competition; both retailers become multi-product sellers. How-
ever, as the pro¯tability of brands diverges su±ciently, only the most prof-
itable brand will be distributed by both retailers thus only arising intra-brand
competition at equilibrium. Also, our ¯ndings suggest that the assumption
of more retailer power is not irrelevant provided that the well-known ex-
clusive and common distribution systems are among the choice set and do
not arise at equilibrium. A natural question to ask is whether the retail-
ers' equilibrium choice of distribution systems would be selected when it is
manufacturers who choose the number of retailers they wish to employ. Sup-
pose that manufacturers choose simultaneously and independently whether
to employ none, retailer one, retailer two, or both. In the second stage, they
decide upon transfer prices and ¯nally retailers compete µ a la Cournot. It can
be shown that, the retailers' equilibrium choice is not always an equilibrium
for manufacturers had it they the option to choose the distribution system.
What our analysis highlights is that there is a con°ict between manufactur-
ers' and retailers' choices and it does matter who are the agents with more
power in the trading relationship.
The analysis of how manufacturers and retailers organize their distribu-
tion systems is part of the literature on vertical restraints. Also, it is an
issue with great interest for anti-trust authorities. Recently, the European
approach to vertical restraints changed. There is a new Block Exemption
4As reported in Gabrielsen and Sorgard (1999a), large retailers use to invite a restricted
number of suppliers to make their o®ers (possibly including exclusive dealership). Then,
the retailers decide which o®er to accept. The contracts have a limited duration at the end
of which the "auction" is repeated. A similar well-known practice is employed by Spanish
retailer chain Mercadona with its "always-low-prices" policy.
5Regulation5 which replace the three old Block Exemption Regulations appli-
cable to exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing and franchising agree-
ments respectively.6 In words of Commissioner Mario Monti, "the Commis-
sion aim with the new regulation is to simplify our rules and reduce the
regulatory burden for companies, while ensuring a more e®ective control of
vertical restraints implemented by companies holding a signi¯cant market
power".7 The new Block Exemption Regulation allows companies, whose
market share is below 30% to bene¯t from a so-called safe harbour under
the Community competition rules.8 The safe harbour o®ers companies the
freedom to create supply and distribution arrangements best suited to their
individual interests. However, the Block Exemption does not apply to two
sets of restrictions. The ¯rst set concerns the so-called hard-core restric-
tions which companies are not allowed to use in their agreements. 9And
more relevant for our purposes, the second set of restrictions not covered
by the new Regulation concerns certain restrictions which are not exempted
5Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/199 of 22 December 1999 on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Amsterdam Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted
practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.99, p. 21-25. The new rules apply from 1 June 2000.
6Commission Regulations (EEC) No 1983/83, OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p. 1, (EEC) No
1984/83 OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p. 5, and (EEC) No 4087/88, OJ L 359, 28.12.1988, p. 46.
7The previous Green Paper on Vertical Restraints by the European Commission (Jan-
uary '97) and a follow-up to the Green Paper (dated September '98) were the basis for the
new approach to vertical restraints embodied in the new regulation. These Communica-
tions precisely incorporate some of the ideas expressed by Caballero-Sanz and Rey (1996)
and Dobson and Waterson (1996) which shift the emphasis from the regulatory approach
underlying the old legislation towards a more economic approach in the assessment of
vertical restraints.
8To highlight the interest of our paper and note that there is still work to be done,
the following statement can be read in the follow-up to the Green Paper: "In general, it
will only be necessary to estimate the market share of the supplier. However, in cases
of exclusive supply the market share of the buyer may have to be used as the relevant
indicator. The guidelines will address the issue of how the Commission will take account
of the buyer's market position in the analysis of individual cases".
9In particular: a producer may not impose on its distributors at which price to resell
its products; a producer may not restrict its distributors selling to any customer if it is
an unsolicited order (passive sales); a producer applying a selective distribution system,
for instance in cosmetics, may neither restrict active nor passive selling by the authorised
distributors to end-users or other authorised distributors; a producer buying components
for incorporation in its own products may not prevent the supplier of the components from
selling these as spare parts to end-users or independent repairers.
6but which may under certain circumstances nonetheless be compatible with
the EC competition rules. The most important concerns exclusive dealing
and its variations (selective distribution, exclusive purchasing) when their
duration exceeds ¯ve years. Above the 30% market share threshold, vertical
agreements will not be covered by the new Block Exemption, but they are
not automatically presumed to be illegal either. They may require an indi-
vidual examination under Article 81 of the Treaty. Therefore, the questions
addressed here are of immediate interest from an anti-trust perspective and,
with the necessary quali¯cations, some policy implications can be extracted.
Our analysis has focused on how, in the presence of retailer decision
power, some vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing would never be ac-
cepted. Note that the various types of competition intensity vary depending
on the agent who holds more power on trading relationships. We will show
that vertical agreements in which retailers are decisive in determining distri-
bution systems ensure su±cient inter and intra-brand competition. In other
words, and to sum up, only will exclusive dealership or vertical foreclosure
appear if a) either the manufacturers are the agents who e®ectively impose
exclusivity clauses, b) or it has jointly been agreed by manufacturers and
retailers, c) or in the presence of more retailer power and su±cient brand
asymmetry.
2T h e M o d e l
We set up a three-stage non-cooperative game to study the equilibrium distri-
bution structure that will arise by the strategic decisions of two manufactur-
ers (M1 and M2) and two retailers (R1 and R2). Each manufacturer produces
a di®erentiated good that can be distributed by either one or two retailers,
or not distributed at all. In the ¯rst stage of the game, the manufacturers
choose and announce simultaneously and independently the transfer prices
to retailers (w1 and w2). In the second stage, the retailers, having observed
the manufacturers' choice in the ¯rst stage, decide simultaneously and in-
dependently with which manufacturer (possibly both or none) they wish to
trade. Finally, and given the inherited outcome of the previous two stages,
the retailers choose simultaneously and independently the quantities of each
of the goods they will sell to consumers. We assume that the manufacturers
7cannot enforce a given distribution structure by including clauses in the con-
tract. In other words, the equilibrium distribution structure is the outcome
of the strategic interaction between retailers given the terms of the contracts
o®ered by the manufacturers.
More speci¯cally, the two manufacturers, M1 and M2, produce their own
branded good under constant returns to scale and incurring a common unit
cost c: The retailers, R1 and R2; are supplied by the manufacturers at a con-
stant unit price, the transfer price. Let wi denote the transfer price set by
manufacturer i. Then, each retailer k; having observed those transfer prices,
chooses the manufacturer(s) with which he wants to trade. Each retailer
k chooses simultaneously and independently one element, sk; from the set
Sk = f0;1;2;12g k =1 ; 2; where sk = 0 denotes not to deal, sk = 1 denotes
that the retailer will deal with M1; likewise for sk =2 ; and ¯nally sk =1 2
means that the retailer will deal with both manufacturers. Then, sixteen dif-
ferent distribution schemes may result from the retailers' strategic choice of
brands. Finally, each retailer selects the quantity for each branded good they
have decided to deal, denoting by qik the quantity of brand i that retailer k
sells to consumers. As the brand produced by each of the manufacturers can
be sold by one, both or none of the retailers, consumers, at least initially,
would be able to distinguish between brands and the place where they are
sold. However, we assume that retailers are not di®erentiated in the sense
that consumers get for brand i the same utility no matter which retailer k is
selling the brand i to them. To close notation, Qi stands for the total amount
of brand i produced and distributed to the retailers which is Qi = qi1 + qi2
when both retailers distribute it. The relevant element(s) of that sum are set
to zero, according to the retailers' choice of distribution system for brand i:
As well as paying the transfers, the retailers incur common retailing costs at
c o n s t a n tp e ru n i tl e v e lr which, for the sake of the exposition and without
loss of generality, are assumed to be zero.
The retailers face a continuum of consumers of the same type. The
representative consumer maximizes U(Q1;Q 2;y) subject to the budget con-
straint I = y + p1Q1 + p2Q2,w h e r eI is the income, y is the quantity of
the numeraire commodity consumed and Qi, pi;i=1 ;2; are the quantity
of the brand produced by the manufacturer i and its market price, respec-
tively. The function U is assumed to be separable, linear in the numeraire
8commodity and quadratic and strictly concave in the di®erentiated good:
U = y +a1Q1 +a2Q2 ¡[b(Q2
1 +Q2
2)+2dQ1Q2]=2; where ai;i=1 ;2;band d
are positive, b2 >d 2 and aib ¡ ajd>0 for i 6= j: This utility function gives
rise to a linear demand schedule, where inverse demands are given by,
p1 = a1 ¡ bQ1 ¡ dQ2 (1)
p2 = a2 ¡ bQ2 ¡ dQ1
We assume, without loss of generality, that a1 >a 2 meaning that the high-
est price (when quantities are set to zero) consumers are willing to pay for
the good produced by M1 is greater than for the one produced by M2: Also,
since d>0a n db>d ;own e®ects on prices are greater than cross e®ects.
Note that the distance between b and d is measuring the degree of inter-brand
rivalry, that is, how similar the brands are perceived by consumers. Then,
brands 1 and 2 are imperfect substitutes and when d approaches b brands
become closer substitutes, this meaning that inter-brand rivalry increases.
Intra-brand rivalry, that is how similar the retailers' services are perceived
by consumers to be when selling the same brand, is maximal. They are per-
fect substitutes: retailers are not di®erentiated.
We begin by computing the Nash equilibrium quantities for each possi-
ble distribution scheme inherited from the second stage. Then, using the
Nash equilibrium quantities, we compute the retailers' equilibrium distribu-
tion choice (either Nash or in dominant strategies) given the transfer prices.
Finally, we ¯nd the Nash equilibrium choice of transfer prices by manufac-
turers.
2.1 The retailers' decisions on quantities
Given the symmetry between retailers, 10 di®erent distribution schemes out
of 16 need to be analyzed. Computations are relegated to Appendix A. In
this subsection, we present the equilibrium quantities and gross pro¯ts (leav-
ing aside any ¯xed costs) for each of the distribution schemes.10 Denote by
10Remark that in the Table in the Appendix whenever two distribution schemes are
reported, the equilibrium quantities and gross pro¯ts follow by a simple exchange of
subindices.
9Rk(s1;s 2)a n dqk(s1;s 2);k=1 ;2 the retailer k0s equilibrium gross pro¯ts
and total quantity, respectively, when R1 has chosen the action s1 2 S1 and
R2 has chosen the action s2 2 S2:
The equilibrium quantities are a function of earlier choices, w1 and w2; and
the distribution schemes. The quantities corresponding to some distribution
systems may become negative depending on the size of (a1 ¡ w1)=(a2 ¡ w2);
the relative per unit pro¯tability of brands for retailers, and then the corner
solutions have to be taken. It is therefore convenient to distinguish the dif-
ferent intervals displayed in ¯gure 1.
Thus, whenever the ratio belongs to interval I1 ´ [ 3bd
2b2+d2; 2b2+d2
3bd ]a l lt h e
quantities corresponding to every distribution system are strictly positive.
The table in Appendix A shows them along with the corresponding pay-
o®s. As the ratio decreases (either w1 goes up or w2 goes down) brand 1
becomes relatively more expensive than brand 2, and this implies that its
distribution does not pay retailers for some distribution systems. In the in-
terval I2 ´ [d
b; 3bd
2b2+d2)q u a n t i t yq11(12;1) and q12(1;12) are set to zero in the
subgames (12;1) and (1;12), respectively. Consequently, the second stage
retailers' choice of (12;1) and (1;12) is payo® equivalent to choosing (2;1)
and (1;2), respectively. For I3 ´ [ d
2b; d
b) the following quantities are zero:
q11(12;1), q12(1;12);q 11(12;2), q12(2;12);q 11(12;12);q 12(12;12);q 11(12;0)
and q12(0;12). In words, brand 1 is never jointly distributed with brand 2 by
the same retailer. Consequently, the choice of strategy 12 is payo® equivalent
to the choice of strategy 2 in stage two. Finally, I4 ´ [0; d
2b) supposes that,
in addition to the above quantities, q11(1;2) and q12(2;1) are set to zero.
Hence, for every distribution system where brand 1 competes with brand 2
the latter remains as the only brand in the market.
Alternatively, when the ratio (a1 ¡ w1)=(a2 ¡ w2) increases brand 1 be-
comes relatively cheaper than brand 2, and this implies that the distribution
of brand 2 does not pay retailers for some distribution systems. A similar
reasoning as above can be applied by exchanging 1 by 2. This gives rise to
intervals I5 ´ (2b2+d2
3bd ; b
d], I6 ´ (b
d; 2b
d ]a n dI7 for a1¡w1
a2¡w2 > 2b
d . The equilibrium
quantities for intervals I2 to I7 follow by applying the above reasoning to







































Table 1: The Second Stage Payo® Matrix for I1
2.2 The retailers' choice of distribution schemes
This is the central stage of the game and it requires the introduction of some
useful terminology. In particular, the term "distribution" h a st od ow i t h
the (number of) channels employed by manufacturers, whereas the word
"purchasing" is used to refer to the (number of) brands that retailers wish to
sell. In the second stage of the game, each retailer k decides simultaneously
and independently the action sk 2 Sk that maximizes his payo®s taking as
given the transfer prices. The possible combination of actions gives rise to
the following distribution schemes:
² Non-exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing (Figure 2a): both
retailers distribute one of the manufacturer's branded product whereas
the rival manufacturer is not present in the market. It refers to the
above mentioned schemes (1;1) and (2;2). This distribution scheme
is equivalent to a homogeneous product duopoly and then, only intra-
brand rivalry appears in the market. Besides, this situation can be
understood as one with vertical foreclosure of one of the manufacturers.
² Duopoly exclusive distribution and purchasing (Figure 2b): each retailer
purchases only one brand and each manufacturer uses just one retailer.
It refers to the distribution schemes (1;2) and (2;1): This distribution
scheme is equivalent to a di®erentiated duopoly and therefore there
is only inter-brand rivalry, and it has been usually called exclusive
dealing by papers in the literature. Further note that it is related
11to those papers invoking the no-intra-brand-competition in retailing
(NICR) assumption.11
² Non-exclusive distribution and purchasing (Figure 2c): the two retail-
ers purchase both brands. It relates to the distribution scheme (12;12):
Therefore, both retailers are multi-product dealers. Furthermore, each
retailer faces for each brand inter-brand rivalry by both the other brand
he is selling and the one sold by the competing retailer. Also, he faces
intra-brand rivalry by the same brand sold by his competitor dealer.
² Exclusive distribution and non-exclusive purchasing (Figure 3a): a sin-
gle retailer distributes both manufacturers' brands, as in the distribu-
tion schemes (12;0) and (0;12): The retailer behaves as a multi-product
monopoly and thus there is only inter-brand rivalry. This distribution
s c h e m eh a sb e e nu s u a l l yr e f e r r e dt oa sc o m m o na g e n c yo rc o m m o n
distribution system by related papers in the literature.
² Monopoly exclusive distribution and purchasing (Figure 3b): it cor-
responds with schemes (1;0); (0;1); (2;0) and (0;2) where only one
retailer and one manufacturer are active in the market. Note that this
distribution scheme is equivalent to what has been termed as a succes-
sive monopoly, either in brand 1 or in brand 2.
² Mixed schemes (Figure 3c): one retailer distributes both brands whereas
the other sells only one of the brands. Therefore, one of the retailers is a
non-exclusive dealer while the other is an exclusive dealer. It embodies
the (1;12); (12;1); (2;12) and (12;2) distribution schemes.
As noted in the introduction, the interaction between retailers leads to
the comparison of more distribution schemes relative to other papers in the
literature. The assumption that more bargaining power is on the retailers'
side will precisely change the resulting equilibrium structures, as shall shortly
be seen. [As noted above, each retailer k chooses simultaneously and inde-
pendently one element, sk; from the set Sk = f0;1;2;12g k =1 ; 2; where
11This is assumed in Lin (1990), O'Brien and Sha®er (1993) and Gabrielsen (1997).
This separated structure is the equilibrium outcome in Bonanno and Vickers (1988) who
study, in a product di®erentiation setting, whether manufacturers wish to delegate sales
to independent retailers (separation) or not (integration).
12sk = 0 denotes not to deal, sk = 1 denotes that the retailer will deal with
M1; likewise for sk =2 ; and ¯nally sk = 12 means that the retailer will
deal with both manufacturers.] Then, sixteen di®erent distribution schemes
may result from the retailers' strategic choice of brands. The corresponding
payo® matrix depends on the pair (w1;w 2) which in turn implies that the
ratio (a1¡w1)=(a2¡w2) will belong to either of the intervals mentioned. We
will end up with a di®erent payo® matrix for each of these intervals. Table
1 displays that of I1.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the second stage in dominant strategies
is:
a) the non-exclusive distribution and purchasing scheme, (12;12); if and only
if the relative per unit pro¯tability of brands belongs to the interval I1[I2[I5;
b) the non-exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing of brand 2 scheme,
(2;2); if and only if the relative per unit pro¯tability of brands belongs to the
interval I3 [ I4; and
c) the non-exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing of brand 1 scheme,
(1;1); if and only if the relative per unit pro¯tability of brands belongs to the
interval I6 [ I7:
Proof. See Appendix B.
The second stage equilibrium is obtained by iterative deletion of domi-
nated strategies in the corresponding payo® matrix for each of the aforemen-
tioned intervals. The second stage equilibrium may be of three types. The
equilibrium distribution con¯guration for I1 [I2 [I5 implies that both inter
and intra-brand rivalry are present when the retailers decide strategically on
the distribution schemes. For each retailer k being a multi-product dealer
is preferred to being a single-product dealer of whichever brand irrespective
of the rival's decision. Hence, both retailers choose sk = 12 for k =1 ;2a s
the equilibrium in dominant strategies. The deletion of dominated strategies
is as follows. Note ¯rst that, given the assumptions in the model, strategy
sk =0f o rk =1 ;2; is always strictly dominated. We show in Appendix B
that sk = 12 strictly dominates sk =1a n dsk = 2 for interval I1, while for
intervals I2 strategy sk = 1 is strictly dominated by sk =2w h i c hi nt u r n
is strictly dominated by sk =1 2 : Similarly, for interval I5;s k = 2 is strictly














































































Table 3: The Second Stage Payo® Matrix for I6
14Suppose now that the ratio (a1 ¡ w1)=(a2 ¡ w2) belongs to the interval
I3. Table 2 shows the corresponding payo® matrix. It can be seen that
strategies sk =2a n dsk = 12 are equivalent for both retailers since none of
them involves the supply of brand 1 from manufacturer 1 at the third stage
equilibrium. Then, by deleting any of them we are left with a two by two
matrix. Let us delete sk =1 2 : It is easy to see that to choose sk = 2 for
k =1 ;2; is a dominant strategy and manufacturer one would be foreclosed
from the market. The equilibrium distribution structure would involve the
existence of only intra-brand competition. A similar reasoning can be ap-
plied for (a1¡w1)=(a2¡w2) 2 I6 ´ (b
d; 2b
d ]t oo b t a i n( 1 ;1) as the equilibrium
distribution structure. The relevant payo® matrix is given in Table 3.
2.3 The manufacturers' decision on transfer prices
At this stage, each manufacturer decides simultaneously and independently
the transfer price wi that maximizes his payo®s. We look for the subgame per-
fect equilibrium of the full game. Let ¹ w = a1¡w1






0 for w1 such that ¹ w 2 I3 [ I4
2(w1¡c)(b(a1¡w1)¡d(a2¡w2))
3(b2¡d2) for w1 such that ¹ w 2 I1 [ I2 [ I5
2
3b(w1 ¡ c)(a1 ¡ w1) for w1 such that ¹ w 2 I6 [ I7 and w1 >c
(2)






0 for w2 such that ¹ w 2 I6 [ I7
2(w2¡c)(b(a2¡w2)¡d(a1¡w1))
3(b2¡d2) for w2 such that ¹ w 2 I1 [ I2 [ I5
2




2) denote the equilibrium pair of transfer prices. An inspection
of the pro¯t functions above shows that, for a given transfer price of the rival,
there exist two local maxima for each manufacturer. The global maximum
depends on the ratio C = a1¡c
a2¡c which can be interpreted as the relative per
unit pro¯tability of brands for the manufacturers and it is greater than or
equal to one. When C 2 [1; 2b2¡d2
db ] the equilibrium pair (w¤
1;w ¤
2)=(^ w1; ^ w2)
15implies that ¹ w 2 I1 [ I2 [ I5: As C increases manufacturer one ¯nds it
pro¯table to deviate from the above equilibrium. The new equilibrium will
imply either manufacturer one setting a limit transfer price ~ w1(w2)o rt h e
monopoly transfer price wm
1 . Both these cases involve that ¹ w 2 I6 [ I7:
Notice that there is no analogous reasoning for manufacturer two given brand
asymmetry. The next proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the full game is a pair of transfer prices
equal to either:
a)w¤
i =^ wi = (2b2¡d2)ai¡bdaj+b(2b+d)c
4b2¡d2 i;j =1 ;2 i 6= j when C 2 [1; 2b2¡d2
db ];
or b)w¤
1 =~ w1(c)=a1 ¡
b(a2¡c)
d ;w ¤







2 = c when C>2b
d :
Proof. : See Appendix B.
Corollary 1 The subgame perfect distribution equilibrium systems are (12;12)
if C 2 [1; 2b2¡d2
db ] or (1;1) if C>2b2¡d2
db :
The result above claims that, for low brand asymmetry (a low C), it is
su±cient that retailers hold the power to choose the number of products they
wish to distribute to obtain endogenously both inter and intra-brand com-
petition; both retailers become multi-product sellers. However, as the prof-
itability of brands diverges su±ciently, only the most pro¯table brand will
be distributed by both retailers thus only arising intra-brand competition at
equilibrium. Note that the greater the degree of product di®erentiation, b
d;
the greater the asymmetry required to end up with only intra-brand com-
petition in the market. It is worth remarking that, regardless of the degree
of product di®erentiation, the non-exclusive distribution and purchasing dis-
tribution system is the retailers' equilibrium choice when brands are equally
pro¯table, a1 = a2: Finally, when inter-brand competition is maximal, b = d;
the retailers will only select to be supplied by the manufacturer with the
greatest consumers' valuation, the greatest a:
As mentioned in the Introduction, our analysis considers a larger number
of possible channel structures compared with the existing literature. Our
¯ndings suggest that this assumption, derived from more retailer power, is
not irrelevant provided that the well-known exclusive and common distribu-
tion systems are among the choice set and do not arise at equilibrium. A
16natural question to ask is whether the (12;12) and (1;1) distribution sys-
tems would be selected when it is manufacturers who choose the number of
retailers they wish to employ. Suppose that manufacturers choose simultane-
ously and independently whether to employ none, retailer one, retailer two,
or both. In the second stage, they decide upon transfer prices and ¯nally
retailers compete µ a la Cournot. It can be shown that, for C 2 [1; 2b2¡d2
db ];
(12;12) is not always an equilibrium since manufacturer M2 has an incentive
to deviate from 12 when C belongs to a subset included in [1; 2b2¡d2
db ]; which
implies su±cient brand asymmetry.
The literature has typically analyzed the exclusive and the common distri-
bution system; the systems (1;2);(2;1) and (12;0);(0;12) in our terminology,
respectively. Where one system prevails upon the other depending on the de-
gree of product di®erentiation and on whether competition is in either prices
or quantities. Of course, these are not equilibria with more retailer power.
What our analysis highlights is that there is a con°ict between manufactur-
ers' and retailers' choices and it does matter who are the agents with more
power in the trading relationship.
3C o n c l u s i o n s
The scarcity of shelf space coupled with the rise in retailer concentration has
shifted the balance of power away from manufacturers and endowed retailers
with a better bargaining position. We have considered a three-stage non-
cooperative game in which, despite the fact that manufacturers play ¯rst in
the choice of transfer prices, retailers play a relevant role in the shaping of
the distribution system. The literature on.distribution systems has typically
considered exclusive versus comon distribution systems ¯nding that manufac-
tures prefer an exclusive distribution system. This is the equilibrium choice
unless we resort to either a mutual manufacturer-retailer agreement (as in
Dobson and Waterson, 1997), or to a cooperative approach (as in Gabrielsen,
1996), or to a dynamic game (as in Gabrielsen, 1997), or to the possibility of
foreclosure under both systems (as in Gabrielsen and S¿rgard, 1999b). We
have found that exclusive dealing systems are not observed in a setting with
more retailer decision power. Furthermore, vertical foreclosure of the less
pro¯table brand will show up the lower the degree of product di®erentiation
and the higher the asymmetry between brands.
17A Appendix: the third stage equilibrium out-
comes.
We proceed to present the equilibrium outputs, prices and gross pro¯ts for
each distribution scheme.
a) The (1;0); (0;1), (2;0); and (0;2) distribution schemes.
In any of these cases there is only one retailer selling in the market. The
distribution scheme (i;0) means that R1 is distributing brand i; i =1 ;2;
while R2 is not distributing any brands; similarly for (0;i). Suppose that
R1 is the only active retailer. He maximizes his pro¯ts de¯ned as follows by
choosing qi1;
R1(qi1)=( ai ¡ bqi1 ¡ wi)qi1 i =1 ;2
and we ¯nd that the equilibrium outcomes are









for i =1 ;2 while for R2 it is obvious that it distributes zero and gets zero
pro¯ts. The restriction on the parameter space to get positive output equi-
libria is that (ai ¡ wi) > 0f o ri =1 ;2:
b) The (12;0) and (0;12) distribution schemes.
Now, we have that only one retailer is active in the market as above, but
he distributes both manufacturers' brands. Therefore, there is one multi-
product retailer. Take for example the case (12;0);R 1 maximizes the follow-
ing
R1(q11;q 21)=( a1 ¡ bq11 ¡ dq21 ¡ wi)q11 +( a2 ¡ bq21 ¡ dq11 ¡ w2)q21
which results in the following equilibrium outcomes
q1(12;0) ´ q11(12;0) + q21(12;0)
=
b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ d(a2 ¡ w2)
2(b2 ¡ d2)
+
b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)
2(b2 ¡ d2)
18=









(a1 ¡ w1)[b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ d(a2 ¡ w2)]
4(b2 ¡ d2)
+
(a2 ¡ w2)[b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)]
4(b2 ¡ d2)
=
b(a1 ¡ w1)2 + b(a2 ¡ w2)2 ¡ 2d(a1 ¡ w1)(a2 ¡ w2)
4(b2 ¡ d2)
In this case. to get positive equilibrium outputs, we need to restrict the









c) The (1;1) and (2;2) distribution schemes.
In both cases we have a homogenous duopoly. Both retailers distribute the
same brand while the other manufacturer's brand is not sold in the market.
Take as an example the case of (1;1): Each retailer maximizes his pro¯ts
choosing quantities.
R1(q11;q 12)=( a1 ¡ b(q11 + q12) ¡ w1)q11
R2(q11;q 12)=( a1 ¡ b(q12 + q11) ¡ w1)q12
The equilibrium quantities are obtained by solving the two-equation sys-
tem of ¯rst order conditions for q11 and q12: These are:
q1(1;1) ´ q11(1;1) =
a1 ¡ w1
3b






R1(1;1) = R2(1;1) =
(a1 ¡ w1)2
9b
19with the same restriction on the parameters as in case presented in the ¯rst
place.
d) The (1;2) and (2;1) distribution schemes.
Here, we have that each retailer is distributing one and only one manu-
facturer's brand. Therefore, there is a di®erentiated duopoly. Consider the
case (1;2): Each retailer maximizes his pro¯ts choosing quantities.
R1(q11;q 22)=( a1 ¡ bq11 ¡ dq22 ¡ w1)q11
R2(q11;q 22)=( a2 ¡ bq22 ¡ dq11 ¡ w2)q22
We obtain the following equilibrium outcomes
q1(1;2) ´ q11(1;2) =
2b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ d(a2 ¡ w2)
4b2 ¡ d2
q2(1;2) ´ q22(1;2) =
2b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)
4b2 ¡ d2
p1(1;2) =
2b2a1 +( 2 b2 ¡ d2)w1 ¡ bd(a2 ¡ w2)
4b2 ¡ d2
p2(1;2) =
2b2a2 +( 2 b2 ¡ d2)w2 ¡ bd(a1 ¡ w1)
4b2 ¡ d2
R1(1;2) =
b[2b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ d(a2 ¡ w2)]2
(4b2 ¡ d2)2
R2(1;2) =
b[2b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)]2
(4b2 ¡ d2)2










e) The (12;12) distribution scheme.
In this case, both retailers distribute the brands of both manufacturers.
Then, we have a multi-product duopoly. Each retailer takes two decisions on
outputs to maximize his pro¯ts,
max
q11;q21R1(q11;q 12;q 21;q 22)=( a1 ¡ b(q11 + q12) ¡ d(q21 + q22) ¡ w1)q11
+(a2 ¡ b(q21 + q22) ¡ d(q11 + q12) ¡ w2)q21
max
q12;q22R2(q11;q 12;q 21;q 22)=( a1 ¡ b(q11 + q12) ¡ d(q21 + q22) ¡ w1)q12
+(a2 ¡ b(q21 + q22) ¡ d(q11 + q12) ¡ w2)q22
20The equilibrium outputs come as the solution to the four-equation system of
¯rst order conditions for q11;q 12;q 21 and q22: We obtain
q1(12;12) = q2(12;12) ´ q11(12;12) + q21(12;12) = q12(12;12) + q22(12;12)
=
b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ d(a2 ¡ w2)
3(b2 ¡ d2)
+
b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)
3(b2 ¡ d2)
=








R1(12;12) = R2(12;12) =
(a1 ¡ w1)[b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ d(a2 ¡ w2)]
9(b2 ¡ d2)
+
(a2 ¡ w2)[b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)]
9(b2 ¡ d2)
=
b(a1 ¡ w1)2 + b(a2 ¡ w2)2 ¡ 2d(a1 ¡ w1)(a2 ¡ w2)
9(b2 ¡ d2)
with the same restriction on the parameters as in the case presented in
the second place.
e) The (12;1); (1;12) and (12;2); (2;12) distribution schemes.
This is an asymmetric case where one of the retailers distributes both
manufacturers' brands while the other only distributes one brand. Then, we
have a multi-product retailer facing a single-product one. Take as an example
the distribution scheme (12;1): Each retailer maximizes his pro¯ts,
max
q11;q21 R1(q11;q 12;q 21)=( a1 ¡ b(q11 + q12) ¡ dq21 ¡ w1)q11
+(a2 ¡ bq21 ¡ d(q11 + q12) ¡ w2)q21
max
q12 R2(q11;q 12;q 21)=( a1 ¡ b(q11 + q12) ¡ dq21 ¡ w1)q12
The equilibrium outputs come as the solution to the three-equation system
of ¯rst order conditions for q11;q 12; and q21: We obtain
q1(12;1) ´ q11(12;1) + q21(12;1) =
=
(2b2 + d2)(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ 3bd(a2 ¡ w2)
6(b2 ¡ d2)
+
b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)
2(b2 ¡ d2)
21=
(2b ¡ d)(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ 3b(a2 ¡ w2)
6b(b + d)







3b(a2 + w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)
3
R1(12;1) =
(a1 ¡ w1)[(2b2 + d2)(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ 3bd(a2 ¡ w2)]
18b(b2 ¡ d2)
+
[3b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)][b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)]
12b(b2 ¡ d2)
=





where the restrictions on the parameters to ensure that q11(12;1) =
q12(1;12) and q21(12;2) = q22(2;12) are positive are,
3bd






The restrictions displayed at the end of each of the above distribution
schemes gives rise to the parameter interval in Figure 1 in the text.
22B Appendix: proofs.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
In this proof we apply iterated deletion of dominated strategies for each of
the relevant intervals in which the ¹ w = a1¡w1
a2¡w2 space is divided to characterize
the second stage equilibrium. Since retailers' payo®s are symmetric, we just
prove the result for R1: Also, it is easy to see that action s1 =0i sd o m i n a t e d
by the other three for each of the possible intervals.
Part a) of Proposition 1 states that (12,12) is the second stage equilibrium
for a1¡w1
a2¡w2 2 I1 [ I2 [ I5:
We prove that (12,12) is the equilibrium for each of the referred intervals:
I1-Interval, 3bd
2b2+d2 · ¹ w · 2b2+d2
3bd .
We show that for retailer 1 action s1 = 12 dominates the other three
actions, i.e. R1(12;s 2) >R 1(s1;s 2); 8s2 2f 1;2;12g; 8s1 2f 1;2g. Firstly,
we check that action s1 = 12 dominates action s1 =2 : This is equiva-
lent to checking when the following inequalities are satis¯ed: a) R1(12;1) >
R1(2;1);b) R1(12;2) >R 1(2;2); c) R1(12;12) >R 1(2;12):
First, a) R1(12;1) >R 1(2;1)
if [64b6 +1 2 b4d2 +5 d6](a1 ¡ w1)2 +9 b2d2(8b2 + d2)(a2 ¡ w2)2
¡ 18bd(8b4+d4)(a1¡w1)(a2¡w2)= [ ( 2 b2¡d2)(a1¡w1)¡3bd(a2¡w2)][(32b4+
10b2d2 +5 d4)(a1 ¡ w1)¡
(24b3d +3 bd3)(a2 ¡ w2)] > 0
Therefore, the inequality is positive when either both terms are positive
or both are negative. Both are positive when
¹ w>
3bd
2b2 + d2 >
3bd(8b2 + d2)
32b4 +1 0 b2d2 +5 d4
which is always sati¯ed for ¹ w 2 I1.
Second, R1(12;2) >R 1(2;2) and R1(12;12) >R 1(2;12) i® [b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡
d(a2 ¡ w2)]2 > 0; which is always satis¯ed. Therefore, we conclude that
action sk = 12 dominates action sk =2f o rk =1 ;2:
Next, we check when action s1 = 12 dominates the action s1 =1 : This
is equivalent to checking when the following inequalities are satis¯ed: a)
R1(12;1) >R 1(1;1);b) R1(12;2) >R 1(1;2); c) R1(12;12) >R 1(1;12):
First, R1(12;1) >R 1(1;1) and R1(12;12) >R 1(1;12) i® [b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡
d(a1 ¡ w1)]2 > 0; which is always satis¯ed.
23Second, b)R1(12;2) >R 1(1;2) if [(2b2¡d2)(a2¡w2)¡3bd(a1¡w1)][(32b4+
10b2d2 +5 d4)(a2 ¡ w2)¡
(24b3d +3 bd3)(a1 ¡ w1)] > 0: This inequality is satis¯ed when either both





32b4 +1 0 b2d2 +5 d4
3bd(8b2 + d2)
which is always sati¯ed for ¹ w 2 I1.
Therefore, we conclude that action sk = 12 dominates action sk = 1 for
k =1 ;2:
Hence for ¹ w 2 I1; we have shown that s1 = s2 = 12 is the equilibrium in
dominant strategies, i.e. the non-exclusive distribution and dealing scheme
is the equilibrium distribution scheme in dominant strategies.
I2-Interval, d
b · ¹ w< 3bd
2b2+d2.
When the pair (w1;w 2) is such that ¹ w 2 I2 the third stage equilibrium
quantities q11(12;1) and q12(1;1 2 )a r es e tt oz e r oi nt h es u b g a m e s( 1 2 ;1) and
(1;12), respectively. Consequently, the second stage retailers' choice of (12;1)
and (1;12) is payo® equivalent to choosing (2;1) and (1;2), respectively. We
¯rst show that action s1 =2d o m i n a t e sa c t i o ns1 = 1, which is equivalent
to showing that a) R1(2;1) >R 1(1;1);and b) R1(2;2) >R 1(1;2); and c)
R1(2;12) >R 1(1;12):
First, a) R1(2;1) >R 1(1;1); if (16b4¡17b2d2+d4)(a1¡w1)2+36b3d(a1¡
w1)(a2 ¡ w2)¡
36b4(a2 ¡ w2)2 < 0; or equivalently if
0 < ¹ w<
6b2
(4b ¡ d)(b + d)
but 6b2
(4b¡d)(b+d) > 1 and therefore, R1(2;1) >R 1(1;1) for ¹ w 2 I2:
Second, note that since R1(2;12) is always equal to R1(2;2) and that
R1(1;12) = R1(1;2) for ¹ w 2 I2; inequalities b) and c) are the same. There-
fore, we ¯nd when it is true that R1(2;2) >R 1(1;2);:or equivalently, when
36b4(a1 ¡ w1)2 ¡ 36b3d(a1 ¡ w1)(a2 ¡ w2)¡
(16b4 ¡ 17b2d2 + d4)(a2 ¡ w2)2 < 0w h i c hi nt e r m so f¹ w amounts to
0 < ¹ w<





2b2+d2and therefore, R1(2;2) >R 1(1;2) for ¹ w 2 I2:
Next, we show that after deleting actions s1 =0a n ds1 =1 ; action
s1 = 12 dominates s1 =2 : This is equivalent to showing that R1(12;2) >
R1(2;2);and R1(12;12) >R 1(2;12); but we know that they are satis¯ed i®
[b(a1 ¡ w1) ¡ d(a2 ¡ w2)]2 > 0. Therefore, we conclude that action sk =1 2
dominates action sk = 2 for k =1 ;2:
Hence for ¹ w 2 I2; we have shown that s1 = s2 = 12 is the equilibrium in
dominant strategies.
I5-Interval, 2b2+d2
3bd < ¹ w · b
d.
The third stage equilibrium quantities q21(12;2) and q22(2;12) are set
to zero in the subgames (12;2) and (2;12), respectively. Consequently, the
second stage retailers' choice of (12;2) and (2;12) is payo® equivalent to
choosing (1;2) and (2;1), respectively. We ¯rst show that action s1 =1
dominates action s1 = 2, that is equivalent to showing that a) R1(1;1) >
R1(2;1); and b) R1(1;2) >R 1(2;2); and c) R1(1;12) >R 1(2;12):
First, note that since R1(1;12) is always equal to R1(1;1) and that
R1(2;12) = R1(2;1) for ¹ w 2 I5; inequalities a) and c) are the same. Therefore
we ¯nd when it is true that R1(1;1) >R 1(2;1): That is, R1(1;1) >R 1(2;1);
if
6b2




3bd then R1(1;1) >R 1(2;1) for ¹ w 2 I5
Second, R1(1;2) >R 1(2;2) if
(4b ¡ d)(b + d)
6b2 < ¹ w
but since
(4b¡d)(b+d)
6b2 < 1w eh a v et h a tR1(1;2) >R 1(2;2) for ¹ w 2 I5:
Next, we show that after deleting actions s1 =0a n ds1 =2 ; action
s1 = 12 dominates s1 =1 : This is equivalent to showing that R1(12;1) >
R1(1;1);and R1(12;12) >R 1(1;12); but we know that they are satis¯ed i®
[b(a2 ¡ w2) ¡ d(a1 ¡ w1)]2 > 0. Therefore, we conclude that action sk =1 2
dominates action sk = 1 for k =1 ;2:
Hence for ¹ w 2 I5; we have shown that s1 = s2 = 12 is the equilibrium in
dominant strategies. Finally, we conclude that for ¹ w 2 I1[I2[I5; the pair of
actions s1 = s2 = 12 is the second stage equilibrium in dominant strategies.
25Part b) of Proposition 1 states that (2,2) is the second stage equilibrium





The third stage equilibrium quantities q11(12;1), q12(1;12);q 11(12;2),
q12(2;12);q 11(12;12);q 12(12;12);q 11(12;0) and q12(0;12) are zero. In words,
brand 1 is never jointly distributed with brand 2 by the same retailer. Con-
sequently, the choice of action sk = 12 is payo® equivalent to the choice of
action sk = 2 in stage two. After the deletion of actions 0 and 12 we prove
that action sk =2d o m i n a t e sa c t i o nsk =1 : This amounts to proving that
R1(2;1) >R 1(1;1) and R1(2;2) >R 1(1;2): However we saw above that both
are satis¯ed i®
0 < ¹ w<
(4b ¡ d)(b + d)
6b2 <
6b2
(4b ¡ d)(b + d)
which is the case since I3 ½ (0;
(4b¡d)(b+d)
6b2 ): Therefore, the second stage equi-
librium for ¹ w 2 I3; is s1 = s2 = 12 in dominant strategies.
I4-Interval, 0 < ¹ w< d
2b:
In addition to the quantities that become zero for the I3-Interval case,
the quantities q12(2;1) and q11(1;2) are also set to zero. In words, the only
way in which brand 1 can be distributed is when it is not competing with
brand 2, that is, distribution systems (1;1), (1;0) and (0;1). Therefore the














where it is easily proven that sk =2d o m i n a t e ssk =1p r o v i d e dt h a t
R1(2;0) >R 1(1;1); that is when ¹ w<3
2; which is the case since I4 ½ (0; 3
2).
Therefore, the second stage equilibrium for ¹ w 2 I4; is s1 = s2 =2i nd o m i n a n t
strategies. Then it is concluded that for ¹ w 2 I3 [ I4; the pair of actions
s1 = s2 = 2 is the second stage equilibrium in dominant strategies.
A parallel reasoning as the one above is employed to prove Part c) of
Proposition 1: where (1;1) is the second stage equilibrium for ¹ w 2 I6 [ I7:
26P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
The strategy of the proof is to ¯nd whether and when manufacturer M1
has incentives to deviate from the equilibrium in which both manufacturers
supply both retailers. Fix w2 equal to ^ w2 = (2b2¡d2)a2¡bda1+b(2b+d)c
4b2¡d2 : Given
that, we may write the corresponding pro¯t function of M1 as M1(w1;w ¤
2):
Let ¦0(w1; ^ w2)=
2(w1¡c)(b(a1¡w1)¡d(a2¡ ^ w2))
3(b2¡d2) and let ¦00(w1; ^ w2)= 2
3b(w1¡c)(a1¡
w1): The unconstrained equilibrium transfer price w¤
1 for ¦0(w1; ^ w2)i s^ w1 =
(2b2¡d2)a1¡bda2+b(2b+d)c
4b2¡d2 ; the unconstrained equilibrium transfer price w¤
1 for
¦00(w1; ^ w2) is the monopoly transfer price wm
1 = a1+c
2 ; the limit transfer price
is obtained from the intersection of ¦0(w1; ^ w2)a n d¦ 00(w1; ^ w2), ~ w1(^ w2)=
a1 ¡
b(a2¡ ^ w2)
d : These equilibrium transfer prices must be ranked in order to
¯nd any pro¯table deviation.
It turns out that: a) for a1¡c
a2¡ ^ w2 belonging to [1; 2b2¡d2
bd ];w m
1 > ^ w1 > ~ w1(^ w2);
b) for a1¡c
a2¡ ^ w2 belonging to [2b2¡d2
bd ; 2b
d ];w m
1 > ~ w1(^ w2) > ^ w1 and c) for a1¡c
a2¡ ^ w2
greater than2b
d ; ~ w1(^ w2) >w m
1 > ^ w1. Note that when manufacturer M1 sets
a transfer prices smaller than or equal to the limit transfer price, the rival
manufacturer is foreclosed from the market, manufacturer M1 relevant pro¯t
branch is the lower one. Thus, in case a), the maximum of ¦00(w1; ^ w2) sub-
ject to w1 2 [c; ~ w1(^ w2)] is ~ w1(^ w2); while the maximum of ¦0(w1; ^ w2)s u b j e c t
to w1 > ~ w1(^ w2)] is ^ w1; and noting that ¦0(~ w1(^ w2); ^ w2)=¦ 00(~ w1(^ w2); ^ w2)
we conclude that the global maximum is ^ w1 and manufacturer M1 has no
incentive to deviate.
In case b), the maximum of ¦00(w1; ^ w2)s u b j e c tt ow1 2 [c; ~ w1(^ w2)] is
~ w1(^ w2); while the maximum of ¦0(w1; ^ w2)s u b j e c tt ow1 > ~ w1(^ w2)] is ~ w1(^ w2):
We conclude that the global maximum is ~ w1(^ w2) and manufacturer M1 has
an incentive to deviate.
Finally, in case c), the maximum of ¦00(w1; ^ w2)s u b j e c tt ow1 2 [c; ~ w1(^ w2)]
is wm
1 ; while the maximum of ¦0(w1; ^ w2)s u b j e c tt ow1 > ~ w1(^ w2)] is ~ w1(^ w2):
We conclude that the global maximum is ~ w1(^ w2); and noting that ¦0(~ w1(^ w2); ^ w2)=
¦00(~ w1(^ w2); ^ w2) we conclude that the global maximum is wm
1 ;manufacturer
M1 has an incentive to deviate.
Whenever manufacturer M1 has an incentive to deviate, manufacturer
M2 may lower the transfer price w2 in order to remain in the market. The
lowest w2 it can ¯x is w2 = c: Substituting in cases b) and c) above ^ w2 for
w2 = c, lead to the intervals for C = a1¡c
a2¡c stated in the proposition.
























(1,1) q1(1;1) = q2(1;1) = a1¡w1
3b R1(1;1) = R2(1;1) =
(a1¡w1)2
9b
(2,2) q1(2;2) = q2(2;2) = a2¡w2
3b R1(2;2) = R2(2;2) =
(a2¡w2)2
9b
(12,12) q1(12;12) = q2(12;12) =
(a1¡w1+a2¡w2)















































(0,0) q1(0;0) = q2(0;0) = 0 R1(0;0) = R2(0;0) = 0 I4 I3  I2                    I1    I5   I6   I7
       a1 - w1
0                                                                              1     a2 - w2  
                  d/2b                   d/b        3bd/(2b
2+d
2)              (2b
2+d
2)/3bd       b/d              2b/d
Figure 1: The Relevant Intervals for the Second Stage of the Game.               
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